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Prior to the Asian financial crisis, social protection in Indonesia was largely based on informal 
arrangements. When the country sank into a deep social and economic crisis in 1998, the 
government had no alternative but to create new, more formal social safety nets explicitly aimed at 
helping the chronic poor and vulnerable non-poor cope with the impact of the crisis. A 
comprehensive set of safety net programs covered food security, employment creation, education, 
health, and community empowerment. Several years after the crisis as the economy slowly recovered 
and welfare stabilized around pre-crisis levels, the government redesigned several of these programs 
while discontinuing others. Throughout this latter, post-crisis period, the government also 
implemented a range of new social protection programs, including several conditional and 
unconditional cash transfer programs, to replace highly regressive fuel subsidies. Recently, the 
government has formed a National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction (TNP2K) with 
the mandate to reduce poverty incidence to 8% by 2014. This essay analyses Indonesia‟s experience 
with social protection during and after the crisis, drawing key lessons for the future of social 
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1 Background on the Evolution of Social Protection Policy since 1997 
 
In mid-1997 after nearly a quarter of century of dramatic economic growth and poverty reduction, a 
currency crisis struck Indonesia. By early 1998 the country was suffering from the combined effects 
of financial, economic, and political crises. Within one year, the value of the Rupiah fell by 85 
percent, domestic prices skyrocketed by 78 percent, nominal food prices increased threefold, and the 
economy contracted by almost 14 percent. As the crisis worsened, mass rioting occurred in the 
capital Jakarta and a few other major cities, culminating in May 1998 with the fall of the Suharto 
government, which had been in power for three decades.  
 
The social impact of the crisis was enormous. The crisis primarily affected the poor and vulnerable 
non-poor through falling real wages3 and a drastic increase in the price of basic commodities. The 
national poverty rate increased from 15 percent in mid-1997 to 33 percent by the end of 1998, 
implying that an additional 36 million people were pushed into absolute poverty due to the crisis.4 
More than half of the increase in poverty between 1996 and 1999 was due to an increase in chronic 
poverty, as the proportion of chronic poor within the total population increased from 3.2 percent to 
9.5 percent during this period.5 Meanwhile, the proportion of non-poor Indonesian households 
facing a high probability of falling below the poverty line had increased dramatically from 6.8 
percent in 1996 to 18.4 in 1999.  
 
To mitigate the adverse social impact of the crisis, the government of Indonesia (GOI) introduced 
social safety net programs---widely referred to by their Indonesian acronym JPS---aimed at 
protecting the chronic poor from falling deeper into poverty and reducing vulnerable households' 
exposure to risk. The JPS had a four-pronged strategy: (i) to ensure the availability of affordable 
food, (ii) to improve household purchasing power through employment creation, (iii) to preserve 
access to critical social services, particularly health and education, and (iv) to sustain local economic 
activity through regional block grants and the extension of small scale credits. In July 1998, with 
financial support from international donors including the World Bank and Asian Development 
Bank, the GOI allocated Rp3.9 trillion directly to JPS programs out of a total development budget 
of Rp14.2 trillion.6 JPS programs covered education, health, community empowerment, and 
employment creation, in addition to a separate program known as OPK, which provided highly 
subsidized rice to poor households. The scale of this social protection initiative, which we refer to 
hereafter as the First Generation, was unprecedented in Indonesian history.7  
In the years after the crisis, the GOI maintained several JPS programs while also mounting a 
number of new social assistance initiatives. In addition to introducing a more well targeted successor 
                                                 
3 Real wages were estimated to have fallen by around one third from August 1997 to August 1998 (Manning, 2000). 
4 The poverty rate increased by 164 percent from the onset of the crisis in mid-1997 to the end of 1998. Sumarto, 
Suryahadi and Pritchett (2003a) produced poverty figures consistent throughout the duration of the crisis. These figures 
differ from official figures published by BPS based on annual Susenas data, which generated poverty lines based on 
incomparable consumption baskets across the crisis years.  
5 Generally, the chronic poor include those households whose expected future consumption levels fall below the poverty 
line, while the transient poor have expected consumption above the poverty line. See Suryahadi and Sumarto (2003) for 
a detailed technical exploration.     
6 For indicative purposes only, the average exchange rate around this time period was Rp10000/USD. BAPPENAS 
actually announced a development budget of Rp17 trillion in September 1998 (Maxwell and Perdana 2004). By 
comparison, the total development budget in the previous fiscal year was Rp2 trillion. The JPS line item excludes the rice 
subsidy program, operasi pasar khusus (OPK). The development budget less the OPK funds stood at roughly Rp8.8 
trillion. Full budget figures available at http://rspas.anu.edu.au/~gfane/, from Daly & Fane (2002).  
7 The World Bank's Public Expenditure Review (2009) report was the first to make reference to these "Generations". 
to OPK known as Raskin or Rice for the Poor, the GOI aimed to restructure regressive subsidies on 
fuel products (BBM)8 and to channel budgetary savings into targeted social protection and poverty 
alleviation programs. On several occasions since 2000, BBM subsidies were slashed and a portion of 
the savings subsequently reallocated to social programs known as PKPS-BBM.9 Alongside dramatic 
cutbacks in March and October 2005, the GOI implemented a substantial compensation package 
including health insurance for the poor, educational assistance, infrastructure development 
programs, and the world's largest unconditional cash transfer (UCT) program targeting over 19 
million poor and near-poor households. In 2007, a smaller-scale conditional cash transfer (CCT) 
program was launched, and in mid-2008, a second round of unconditional cash transfers were 
implemented after further fuel subsidy cutbacks. We refer to Raskin and the programs originating in 
PKPS-BBM as the Second Generation of social protection in Indonesia. 
 
In drawing lessons from First and Second Generation programs, policymakers today are striving to 
create a more efficient, equitable and ultimately permanent social protection system. The goal is not 
merely to provide risk-coping mechanisms in response to economic shocks but also to institute 
sustainable programs that support intergenerational pathways out of poverty. The country has made 
great strides in reducing poverty to pre crisis levels (see Figure 1), yet much remains to be done. The 
government's Medium Term Development Plan for 2010-2014 focuses on the multidimensional and 
long-term nature of poverty alleviation, continuing the shift from universal subsidies to targeted 
social protection programs. Its goal is to reduce poverty from 14 per cent in 2009 to 8 per cent in 
2014. Chief among the institutions leading this effort today is the National Team for Accelerating 
Poverty Reduction (TNP2K) established in the Office of the Vice President in 2010.  TNP2K has 
been given the responsibility of overseeing the coordination of three clusters of poverty programs, 
household-based social assistance programs (e.g., Raskin, CCT), community empowerment 
programs, and programs to expand economic opportunities for low-income households in areas 
such as micro credit. 
 
Over the last several years, three programs---the UCT, Raskin, and Health Insurance for the Poor 
(Jamkesmas)---have amassed the largest share of government expenditures on social protection and 
assistance. In 2008, the UCT accounted for 40 percent of total social assistance spending, Raskin for 
34 percent, and Jamkesmas for 13 percent (World Bank 2009, PER). The three programs have the 
same target population: poor and near-poor (<1.2 times the poverty line) households, which 
comprised 22 percent of all households in 2009. In terms of population coverage, 27 percent of 
households received the UCT, 52 received Raskin benefits, and 28 percent received Jamkesmas 
health cards (Alatas, Purnamasari and Wai-Poi, forthcoming). A deeper understanding of the 
effectiveness of these programs in reducing poverty will be a key ingredient in the discussion over 
the future direction of social protection.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a rigorous 
account of the successes and failures of First and Second Generation social protection programs. 
While the targeting of several JPS programs has been called into question by numerous authors, the 
evidence suggests that without these programs social welfare would not have recovered in such a 
relatively short time. The Second Generation programs have since helped to maintain these post-
crisis gains despite periodic bouts of economic volatility and, more importantly, have also enabled 
                                                 
8 In Indonesia, bahan bakar minyak (BBM) refers primarily to three fuel products: kerosene, automotive diesel, and 
gasoline.   
9 Program Kompensasi Pengurangan Subsidi Bahan Bakar Minyak, Fuel Subsidy Reduction Compensation Program.   
the central government to transition into a more progressive public spending regime. We devote 
considerable discussion to the UCT program in 2005-6 based on the results of our recent impact 
evaluation (Bazzi, Sumarto, and Suryahadi 2010). In Section 3, we discuss the prospects for the 
future of social protection policy. We call particular attention to two ongoing debates with important 
implications for social protection policy, namely the distinct role of conditional and unconditional 
cash transfers as well as the importance of trade policies for food security. Section 4 concludes with 
a brief account of lessons learned and the most recent policy discussion in Jakarta. 
 
2 Two Generations of Social Protection Policies and Programs 
 
2.1 First Generation 
 
The First Generation programs operated in five major sectors: food security, employment creation, 
education, health, and community empowerment. While different ministries designed and 
implemented each of the programs, the government also established a team specifically tasked with 
monitoring overall implementation. The team was headed by the National Development Planning 
Agency (BAPPENAS) at the central level and by the provincial and district development planning 
boards at the local level. Table 1 summarizes the objectives, intended magnitude, geographical 
coverage, benefits provided, eligibility, source of funding, and targeting of the major First 
Generation programs.  
 
2.1.1 Food Security 
 
The government initially introduced the rice subsidy program (OPK) in July 1998 to ensure 
continued access among the poor to affordable rice, the basic staple food for the majority of 
Indonesians. By far the most important commodity among the poor, rice comprises nearly a quarter 
of average monthly expenditures in the poorest 20 percent of Indonesian households. After a 
successful pilot program in Jakarta, the program was expanded to the rest of the country. Initially, 
only households in the lowest category of the official poverty classification available at the time were 
eligible to participate in the program, but coverage was eventually expanded to include the second 
lowest category during the course of the year.10  
 
The OPK program was the largest and arguably most critical component of the SSN programs 
during the crisis. Program guidelines initially allowed eligible households to purchase 10 kilograms of 
rice per month at a highly subsidized price of 1,000 Rupiah per kilogram, compared to an average 
market price of 3,000 Rupiah per kilogram for medium quality rice. Olken (2006) estimates that the 
OPK transfers constituted 9 to 11 percent of total pre-program monthly expenditure for the median 
participant household. Suggestive econometric evidence indicates that OPK recipients experienced 
an increase in per capita household consumption on the order of four percent higher than 
comparable non-recipients (Sumarto, Suryahadi and Widyanti, 2005). 
 
Despite its wide reach, the OPK program suffered from weak targeting performance. By 2001, over 
20.2 million households reported receiving subsidized rice, nearly double the target population, and 
                                                 
10 The official classification was created by the national family planning agency (BKKBN), which groups households into 
five welfare statuses: „pre-prosperous households‟ (“keluarga pra-sejahtera” or KPS), „prosperous I households‟ (“keluarga 
sejahtera I” or KS I), KS II, KS III, and KS III+. Every year, BKKBN conducts a census on households all over the 
country and, based on the data collected, classifies households into the five welfare categories using 23 indicators.  
yet only 53 percent of the poor participated. Geographic targeting was conducted according to 
regional poverty rates derived from baseline data provided by the national family planning agency 
(BKKBN). At the community level, though, where village governments were responsible for 
implementation, administrative guidelines often proved socially unacceptable. In distributing the 
benefits, local village leaders generally did not adhere to the list of eligible households, which they 
argued were an inaccurate reflection of the village welfare distribution.11  
 
In the face of mounting criticism, the GOI introduced in mid-2001 a set of changes to OPK 
including the new program name of Rice for the Poor or Raskin. Prior to the first large-scale UCT in 
late 2005, Raskin remained the most extensive social protection program. Although targeting has 
improved relative to OPK, recent evidence suggests that the program continues to experience 
significant leakage of benefits to non-poor households (Alatas, Purnamasari and Wai-Poi, 
forthcoming). At the same time, relative to the UCT and Jamkesmas programs, Raskin has a lower 
exclusion error in that as of 2009 only 23 percent of poor households reported not receiving 
benefits in the last three months. In practice, in rural areas local officials and community 
organizations continue to redistribute Raskin rice to non-beneficiary households effectively reducing 
the eligible amount of subsidized rice (10 kg per month) actually received by some beneficiaries.12 
Ultimately, the effectiveness of Raskin is counteracted by the GOI's protectionist trade policy with 
respect to rice imports. These policies have proven to be a persistent source of consumption 
volatility for poor households, the effects of which can only be partially offset by Raskin benefits. 
We return to this issue in Section 3 below. 
 
2.1.2 Employment Programs 
 
Another large component of the JPS system was the employment creation program, known as padat 
karya, launched in late 1997. By FY1998/99, 16 different programs were operating under the 
„employment creation‟ category. These programs could be classified into four types: 
 On-going investment and infrastructure projects that planners subsequently redesigned into 
more labor-intensive programs and modes of contracts.  
 Block grants given to local communities such as the Kecamatan Development Program 
(PPK), the Village Infrastructure Project (IDT), and the Regional Empowerment to Overcome 
the Impact of Economic Crisis (PDM-DKE) Program. These funds were directed to poorer 
areas, offering utilization menus that included the possibility of public works.  
 Special labor-intensive works and retraining programs for laid-off workers carried out by 
sectoral ministries.  
 “Food for work” programs, typically launched by international donors and NGOs in 
drought-stricken regions. 
By FY1999/2000 the padat karya programs were reduced to two, a public works program and a 
special initiative for unemployed women.   
 
Although some employment creation programs were targeted to specific areas, there was a notable 
lack of implementation guidelines. Household targeting was primarily implicit as workers self-
selected into the program based on going wage rates. There was no fixed minimum wage rate, but in 
                                                 
11 The recent study by Alatas et al (2010) confirms that community-based targeting is more effective at reaching the 
poorest households than a method based solely on administrative criteria and implemented through a proxy means test. 
12 It is unclear whether such redistribution can be detected in available household survey data. 
some regions, the wage rate was actually set higher than the prevailing local wage rate, thus inducing 
those already working to switch jobs or to take additional jobs. Available evidence suggests that 
households with at least one member participating in the program experienced an increase in per 
capita consumption approximately four percent higher than comparable non-participant households 
(Sumarto, Suryahadi and Widyanti, 2005). The labor programs fared better along measures of 
dynamic benefit incidence than other JPS programs in health and education. This could be largely 
explained by the self-selection mechanism, which responds to welfare changes more efficiently than 
do administratively assigned benefits (Sumarto, Suryahadi and Pritchett 2003b). In this regard, the 
labor programs may have effectively reached not only the chronic poor but also vulnerable near-
poor households facing transitory shocks. 
 
2.1.3 Health  
 
Anticipating the deterioration in public and family health as a result of the crisis, the GOI 
established JPS programs in the health sector. Policymakers hoped to enable public health providers 
to maintain the quality and availability of services and poor households to afford the higher costs of 
medical services. These programs consisted of a targeted consumer price subsidy, nutritional 
supplements, and operational support for public health facilities and village midwives. Based on 
similar targeting criteria as OPK and irrespective of health status, eligible households received health 
cards, which could be used to obtain medical services at public health clinics free of charge. By 
February 1999, approximately 22 million Indonesian households had at least one health card. 
Program planners in Jakarta allocated operational grants to service providers based on the predicted 
number of poor in the area served by the respective facility or midwife organization. The bulk of 
these funds went towards the procurement of medical supplies.   
 
Impact evaluations of the JPS health program produced mixed findings. Targeting was generally 
progressive as the poorest two quintiles received nearly 60 percent of health cards (Sparrow, 2006).  
However, the actual utilization of the cards for outpatient care was negligible in comparison to the 
quantity of cards distributed. The low utilization rates among recipients were likely attributable to 
the same constraints the poor face in non-crisis periods including significant time and travel costs to 
reach health facilities as well as limited access to information regarding health service quality and 
availability.13 The high rate of underutilization also reflected the weak linkage between the 
disbursement of health cards and the allocation of operational grants. Nevertheless, among the poor 
the health card program led to increased health care utilization and a moderate shift from private to 
subsidized public facilities.14 For the non-poor, a similar shift in utilization was observed. Quasi-
experimental evidence suggests the operational grants had a relatively stronger impact on overall 




                                                 
13 There are two other potential explanations for low utilization rates. The first is that households refrained from using 
the health cards when obtaining medical service because they perceived such services to be inferior. Another 
straightforward explanation is that the Susenas survey was conducted only a few months after the majority of the health 
cards had been distributed, leaving a short time window in which households would have utilized health services, the 
expenditure on which is generally more sporadic than on education or food. The fact that health cards were to be 
distributed to the poor irrespective of health status supports this hypothesis.    
14 Prior to the crisis, the use of public primary health services was higher for the non-poor (Lanjouw et al, 2002). This 
suggests that relatively wealthier households were likely to benefit substantially from the JPS-BK programs.   
In the early stages of the crisis, there was a concern that parents might be pressured to withdraw 
their children from school as a way to cope with falling incomes and rising school costs, hence 
triggering a large increase in dropout rates.15 This rightly alarmed the government, which responded 
by establishing an educational funding program in the academic year 1998-99. 
 
The JPS education program included scholarships for students from poor families and block grants 
for schools to facilitate continued operations. The program aimed to reach at most 6 percent of 
primary school students, 17 percent of lower secondary school students, and 10 percent of upper 
secondary school students nationwide. Meanwhile, budgetary constraints dictated taht 60 percent of 
schools in each district were to receive operational grants (DBO), which could be used to purchase 
school materials, make physical repairs and cover other operational costs.  Similar to the Progresa 
program in Mexico, the JPS scholarships provided cash to students from poor households as an 
increasing function of enrollment level with 10,000 Rupiah per month for students in primary 
school (SD), 20,000 Rupiah for junior secondary (SMP), and 30,000 for upper secondary (SMA). By 
comparison, average monthly expenditure on education per student was 4,900, 16,100, and 30,400 
Rupiah for primary, junior secondary and senior secondary students respectively in the 1997-98 
academic year. The scholarships covered nearly eight percent of average monthly per capita 
expenditure among recipient households in the poorest quintile.16  
 
The official targeting mechanism consisted of three stages. In the first stage, scholarships were 
allocated to districts based on a poverty index constructed from 1996 Susenas. Subsequently, district 
committees decided on the amount of scholarship funds to allocate to schools. In the final stage, 
JPS committees at each school17 allocated scholarships to students based on poverty status, 
household structure, distance to school, and gender. Half of the scholarships were to be distributed 
to girls, and in fact, girls received more scholarships than boys at all three levels of schooling 
(Sparrow, 2006). Given that primary school attendance in grades 1-3 is relatively income inelastic in 
Indonesia, students in these grades were deemed ineligible for the scholarships. For all intents and 
purposes, the program operated as a quasi-conditional cash transfer. Although very loosely 
monitored, receipt of the scholarships did require continued enrollment and a passing grade, but 
there were no formal conditions on school attendance or how the funds could be used.  
 
Although overall coverage of the poor was rather limited as seen in Figure 2, the scholarship 
program generated measureable improvements in educational outcomes. Despite the severity of the 
crisis impact on household welfare, large-scale dropouts were prevented among younger school-age 
children. Econometric evidence suggests that the program succeeded in returning enrolment to pre-
crisis levels, especially for primary school-age children in rural areas. Approximately 13 percent of 
JPS recipients would have dropped out of school if they had not received the scholarship, yielding 
                                                 
15 Sparrow (2006) cites the following findings on the educational response to the crisis: Cameron and Worswick (2001) 
find that households smoothed consumption by reducing expenditures on education particularly for girls in rural 
households in response to crop loss, while Frankenberg et al (2002) found that households smoothed consumption by 
reducing expenditures on education and health during the crisis by as much as 37 percent. Thomas et al (2004) found 
that household spending on education declined by 19 percent per enrolled household member from 1997-1999. 
16 Authors' calculation based on Susenas 1999.  
17 School committees consisted of the principal, a teacher representative, a student representative, the head of parents‟ 
association, and the village head. 
an increase in overall enrollment by 0.6 percent (Sparrow, 2006).18 Unlike the JPS health programs, 
though, the demand-side (scholarships) had a larger impact on enrollment than did the supply-side 
(DBO operational grants). By raising the reservation wages of poor students, the JPS program 
reduced the use of child labor as a consumption smoothing mechanism in recipient households.19 
 
2.2 Second Generation Policies and Programs 
 
Indonesia's fuel subsidies, among the largest in Asia (see Figure 3), have long kept the domestic 
price of fuel products much lower than international prices. Figure 4 shows that these subsidies tend 
to be absolutely regressive in that the majority of overall benefits accrued to non-poor households. At 
the same time, the kerosene subsidy is relatively progressive in urban areas. During this post-crisis 
period, successive governments gradually increased the price of BBM and began experimenting with 
new compensation packages (PKPS-BBM) as well as new programs in health and education.20  
 
In mid-2000, policymakers launched the first phase in a the politically challenging process of cutting 
fuel subsidies. After scaling down subsidies by roughly 12 percent in October 2000, the GOI 
reallocated 800 billion Rupiah in savings to a package of short-term compensatory programs 
including cash transfer, revolving funds and community empowerment programs aimed at 
employment generation. Based on BKKBN criteria, roughly 6.6 million poor households across the 
country received 10,000 Rupiah per month for three months. The revolving funds program aimed to 
increase capital available to small businesses and microenterprises through existing financial 
institutions. The revolving funds program distributed 100 million Rupiah to savings and loan 
cooperatives and 50 million Rupiah to microfinance institutions. Available evidence suggests that the 
program‟s limited budget and implementation timeframe constrained the resulting impact on 
poverty and welfare.21 
 
In 2005 on the heels of escalating global oil and gas prices, the GOI slashed fuel subsidies more 
dramatically than ever before. The subsidy reform proceeded in two stages. In March 2005, the 
government raised gasoline and automotive diesel prices by 33 and 27 percent respectively. The 
price of kerosene, the least regressively subsidized good, was initially left untouched. After several 
months and some publicity, the GOI slashed subsidies dramatically on October 1st effectively 
raising prices of the three fuel products by a weighted average of 114 percent. Previously immune to 
policy change, kerosene prices nearly tripled increasing by 186 percent while gasoline and diesel 
prices grew another 88 and 105 percent respectively. 
 
The subsidy reform measures yielded over 10 billion US$ in annualized budgetary savings, a portion 
of which was allocated to renewed programs in health, education, infrastructure as well as an 
unconditional cash transfer scheme. Prior to the October price hike, the government had already 
allocated 5 trillion Rupiah to education, 3 trillion Rupiah to health and 3 Rupiah trillion to 
                                                 
18 Additionally, Cameron (2002) found that the JPS scholarships reduced dropouts at the junior secondary level by three 
percent 
19 See Sparrow (2006, pp. 109-117) on the effect of the JPS scholarship program on the simultaneous decision regarding 
school attendance and work activities among enrolled children. Priyambadi, Sumarto and Suryahadi (2004) show that 
labor and schooling are not mutually exclusive activities among children in poor Indonesian households. 
20 The original JPS health cards program was discontinued in most areas by the end of 2001, and the JPS scholarships 
program ended in 2003.   
21 See SMERU (2001) for the full field research findings. 
infrastructure. From October 2005 to October 2006, the GOI distributed quarterly installments of 
300,000 Rupiah (about 30 USD) to over 19 million households, effectively embarking upon the 
world's largest UCT program. 
 
 
2.2.1 Unconditional Cash Transfer22 
 
The UCT program was designed explicitly to prevent poor and near-poor households from having 
to reduce expenditures on essential food commodities, health and education as kerosene prices 
spiked and overall inflation soared. Poor households relied on subsidized cooking oil and were 
therefore expected to be hurt directly by any policy changes targeting kerosene. Furthermore, the 
17.9% year-on-year inflation from February 2005 to February 2006 and 8.7% month-on-month 
inflation from September to October of 2005 was expected to hit the poor hardest. 
 
Targeting of UCT benefits would prove difficult given the challenges of identifying ex ante which 
households were most exposed to the subsequent price shocks. Political exigency and prior 
experience with social welfare programs largely guided the targeting procedures and institutional 
implementation. However, the relatively short period between program conception and rollout left 
enumerators and implementing agencies time constrained relative to other countries' experiences 
with such large scale cash transfer programs.  
 
The targeting of beneficiaries proceeded in three stages. First, local government officials devised a 
large list of potential recipients in August 2005. Second, using a minimalist survey instrument, the 
regional statistical bureaus enumerated those households. However, only 56 percent of recipient 
households recall ever being visited by enumerators, while the majority of those enumerated were 
visited not by BPS officials but merely by local government officials. Lastly, the Central Statistics 
Bureau (BPS) used the survey data to implement a proxy-means test to generate the final list of 
eligible households by the end of September. BAPPENAS along with BPS established the proxy 
means test based on 14 variables from the eligibility survey capturing household welfare indicators.23 
This was the first time in Indonesian history that proxy means tests were used to target poor 
households in a national social assistance program.  Given the initial program budget, all poor and 
near-poor households were technically eligible though many non-(near-)poor households received 
benefits while numerous poor and near-poor households were excluded. 
 
Although nearly 80 percent of households knew the total amount of quarterly benefits to which 
recipient households were entitled, local officials in some regions succeeded in extracting a portion 
of the officially mandated 300,000 Rupiah quarterly disbursements. Approximately 6.5 percent of 
recipients were subject to these informal taxes at the time of obtaining their first UCT disbursement 
in late 2005, and 8.5 percent of recipients paid a tax on their second disbursement in the first two 
months of 2006. According to recipients subjected to these taxes, the proceeds were meant to cover 
                                                 
22 All figures cited without reference in this section are drawn from Bazzi, Sumarto, and Suryahadi (2010). 
23 The questions concerned: 1) floor type, 2) wall and roof type, 3) toilet facility, 4) electrical source, 5) cooking fuel 
source, 6) drinking water source, 7) frequency of meat consumption, 8) frequency of meal consumption, 9) frequency of 
purchase of new clothes, 10) access to public health facilities, 11) primary source of income, 12) educational attainment 
of household head, 13) amount of savings and type of assets, and 14) floor width. Unfortunately, the data used to devise 
the official proxy-means test is not available to researchers. 
local ID/certificate administration, security at disbursement centers, but most were claimed to be 
intended for local redistribution to deserving non-recipients.  
 
The full transfer amounted to approximately half of monthly household expenditures (measured in 
early 2005) for the median recipient and almost twice as much as median expenditures in per capita 
terms. The UCT benefits were larger than any direct welfare transfers in the past, but given rapid 
inflation the real value of the transfers was much more limited. Recipient households reported a 
range of uses for the funds: 23 percent reported using the transfers for kerosene expenditures (the 
"tagging" effect); 9 percent for education; 31 percent for health; 6 percent for food; 12 percent for 
capital; 20 percent for other. While household income is certainly fungible, these subjective 
assessments provide a glimpse into household valuations of the program. 
 
The program's vast scope yielded substantial variation in pre-program welfare levels within and 
between recipient and non-recipient groups. Recipient households were indeed poorer on average 
than non-recipients in early 2005 prior to the UCT rollout. Yet there was still evidence of potential 
(i) leakage of benefits as 37% of UCT recipients were in the top three national per-capita 
expenditure quintiles, and (ii) undercoverage as half of the lowest quintile did not receive any 
benefits. Figure 5 bears out these targeting results, and Figure 6 shows that the UCT targeting 
outcomes were relatively comparable with programs in other developing countries in the Americas. 
The main difference with these programs is that the UCT benefits accrued to a large number of 
non-poor households in the top 60 percent of the baseline expenditure distribution. Given existing 
data, however, it is not possible to determine whether benefits were indeed mistargeted based on 
proxy means scores. Still, the fact remains that 73 percent of UCT recipients were non-poor based 
on region-specific poverty lines for early 2005. Only 50 percent of poor households received any 
transfers while 39 percent of near-poor households received transfers. Household perceptions of 
targeting outcomes are mostly consistent with the preceding findings.24  
 
In Bazzi, Sumarto and Surayahadi (2010), a rich array of nonexperimental identification strategies 
offer a mixed view of the program's effectiveness. On the one hand, we find that the UCT led to 
increased utilization of outpatient healthcare services as well as a reduction in the labor supply of 
currently enrolled schoolchildren. With regards to expenditure outcomes, however, the program did 
not yield growth among recipients at the same pace as comparable non-recipients. By exploiting a 
unique feature of the program rollout, we show nevertheless that households that received two 
disbursements by January-February 2006 achieved higher consumption growth than did comparable 
households that received a single disbursement. Tables 2 and 3 summarize these primary results, 
reporting the average binary and multivalued treatment effect of the cash transfers on recipient 
households. Further details on the estimation procedures and results can be found in Bazzi, Sumarto 
and Surayahadi (2010).  
 
Why, though, did such a large UCT program not exhibit the uniformly positive treatment effects, 
especially on aggregate expenditures, observed in many other settings? In general, the findings 
                                                 
24 Almost half (43 percent) of all households believed non-poor households within their village had benefited from the 
UCT. Among the one-third of households with any complaints about the UCT program, 48 percent believed benefits 
were misallocated. Moreover, households aware of local protests surrounding the UCT disbursement process believed 
mistargeting to be responsible in 53 percent of incidents. Perceptions of other households notwithstanding, a mere 15 
percent of households believed their treatment status to be incorrect. 
 
suggest that the targeting of UCT benefits may have been a crucial determinant of the outcomes 
observed in this evaluation. Given the absence of the underlying proxy means test (PMT) eligibility 
scores, forging a plausible counterfactual to UCT recipient households posed a substantial empirical 
challenge. Although we observe substantial overlap in propensity scores relative to other 
nonexperimental evaluations in the literature, our (generalized) propensity score model explains 
merely one-fifth of the variation in treatment status across households. While we utilize a wide array 
of household characteristics with relatively flexible functional forms, our baseline data only offer a 
subset of characteristics observable to enumerators and local officials. It is therefore possible that 
the unobserved local targeting process successfully identified those households for whom future 
earnings potential were lowest, thereby inducing a mechanical downward bias in the estimated 
treatment effects. 
 
An additional potentially important explanation concerns non-classical measurement error in 
expenditure reporting in the follow-up survey data. The first few months of the UCT program in 
2005 generated a great deal of public controversy surrounding the allocation of benefits and 
widespread perception of mis-targeting. During that period, eligibility lists were not only being 
expanded but in some cases redrawn altogether. Recipient households enumerated in February 2006 
may therefore have perceived their ongoing participation as being contingent on reported welfare 
levels. Such beliefs could have led to systematic underreporting of expenditure levels among 
precisely those households which had received UCT disbursements by early 2006, and especially 
those households awaiting a second disbursement. This quasi-Ashenfelter's dip also potentially 
imparts a substantial downward bias in estimated treatment effects for expenditure and other easily 
manipulable non-expenditure outcomes. 
 
Ultimately, there are several plausible explanations for the seeming puzzle that UCT beneficiaries' 
expenditures grew slower than comparable non-recipients. One argument holds that the transfers 
were simply too small to accomplish such wide-ranging compensation or that the urban poor 
received too little compensation relative to rural households less affected by the subsidy downgrades 
(Yusuf and Resosudarmo, 2008). Our findings, however, may still be consistent with economic 
theories concerning household responses to predictable and transitory income shocks such as that 
imparted by the UCT. First, a  simple marginal utility of income argument suggests that the response 
to a positive non-labor income shock at time t should, all else equal, be declining in wealth levels at 
time t-1. Considering that a sizable share of UCT recipients were non-poor, this hypothesis could 
explain the low treatment effects we find. Second, taking the permanent income and life cycle 
hypotheses seriously, it is perhaps not surprising that we find null or even negative treatment effects 
when examining expenditure growth in a treatment group comprised of relatively poorer 
households. Third, a concomitant upswing in rice prices discussed in Section 3 undoubtedly hit the 
relatively poorer UCT recipient households hardest. Nevertheless, the fact that the UCT program 
provided households with differential access to health services and child labor-saving investments 
should not be overlooked when weighing the overall impact of the program. 
 
In the absence of the UCT, we argue that poverty levels would have risen even more than the 
official 1.75 percentage point increase estimated by the GOI for the period from 2005 to 2006 (see 
Figure 1). Consider first the simple observation that the UCT need not have induced expenditure 
growth to contribute to observable reductions in poverty. With considerable variation in the extent 
of inflation across regions of the country, marginal increases in expenditure growth among recipients 
might still translate into transitions out of poverty. Table 4 shows poverty transitions for recipients 
and non-recipients between 2005 to 2006 as well as between 2005 to 2007. Over the former period, 
we find that 15 percent of UCT recipients moved out of poverty compared to six percent of non-
recipients. At the same time, 10 percent of UCT recipients transition into poverty compared to five 
percent of non-recipients. Expenditures are simply relatively more volatile for recipients than non-
recipients over the short-term. Meanwhile, by 2007, the poverty transitions remain roughly similar to 
one year earlier---a finding consistent with the relatively similar estimates of program impact through 
2006 and 2007. Although we have not assigned causal interpretations to Table 4, the figures suggest 
that UCT recipients were relatively more likely to move into and out of poverty.25 
 
In retrospect, the UCT program attempted to address three fundamental concerns of any social 
planner: (i) to ensure chronically poor households do not fall deeper into poverty as a result of 
income shocks, (ii) to protect near- and non-poor households from slipping into poverty, and most 
ambitiously (iii) to promote welfare improvements among poor households pushing them to higher 
expenditure gradients. As discussed below, a concomitant increase in rice prices ultimately 
constrained the welfare effects of the cash transfer on first order expenditure outcomes. In 2008, the 
GOI introduced another round of fuel subsidy cutbacks and a second UCT program lasting nine 
months. A rigorous impact evaluation of the program has not yet been conducted, though targeting 
outcomes have been assessed in detail by Alatas, Purnamasari, and Wai-Poi (forthcoming). In 
general the program appears to have been similarly targeted as the prior UCT renewing questions as 
to the effectiveness of Indonesia's targeting system. We return to this issue in the next section when 
discussing proposed improvements to targeting procedures and the future role of cash transfers in 
Indonesia's social protection system. 
 
2.2.2 Scholarships and School Operational Assistance Grants 
 
In the 2001/2 academic year, the GOI utilized PKPS-BBM funds to implement a new scholarship 
program known by its Indonesian acronym BKM26 for students in primary, junior and senior 
secondary schools. Operating alongside the earlier JPS scholarships program, the BKM program 
provided scholarships to far more students and stipulated how scholarship funds could be spent. 
Nearly 20 percent of SD students and 26 percent of SMP students received scholarships in 2004. 
School committees were asked to designate eligibility based on flexible criteria similar to JPS.  
 
After the March 2005 subsidy cutbacks, the GOI developed a new educational assistance program 
known as the school operational assistance program known by its Indonesian acronym BOS for the 
2005/6 academic year. As part of the government initiative to achieve nine years of compulsory 
education, the Ministry of Education had calculated that 50 trillion Rupiah would be required 
annually to provide free primary and junior secondary schooling. The BOS program targeted SD and 
SMP schools, and unlike the DBO-JPS operational grants that went to the poorest 60 percent of 
schools in each district, the BOS program provided funds to all schools across the archipelago with 
SD and SMP schools receiving 235,000 and 324,500 Rupiah per student. Approximately 5.1 trillion 
Rupiah were allocated to all public and private schools in the country, serving approximately 39.6 
million total students. Alongside BOS, education planners refocused the BKM program on SMA 
schools, increasing scholarship size to 60,000 Rupiah per month for nearly 700,000 senior secondary 
school students.  
 
                                                 
25 Recipient households' relative proximity to the poverty line could of course explain some of the difference with non-
recipients. 
26 Bantuan khusus murid, special assistance for students.   
The BOS program enabled schools to reduce or even cancel school tuition fees without adversely 
affecting the quality of education. In contrast to the BKM/JPS programs, which provided 
scholarship funds directly to poor students, BOS tasked school committees with allocating funds 
among any of the eleven expenditure categories stipulated in program guidelines.27 Guidelines 
mandated the elimination of tuition in schools which prior to receiving BOS had charged tuition 
rates less than BOS funds. If pre-program tuition rates exceeded BOS funds, schools had to exempt 
poor students from fees and reduce tuition for other students. Schools provided additional 
assistance to poor students in the form of transportation, uniforms, school bags, stationery and 
reductions in other fees.  
 
In practice, the BOS program operated as a generalized education subsidy targeting both supply- and 
demand-side outcomes. The program reduced the overhead costs of education allowing providers to 
allocate greater resources toward the variable costs generally borne by students' families. In a study 
of 43 schools across five provinces, only 23 percent of students received special assistance by way of 
BOS funds (SMERU, 2006). While the BOS program generated clear benefits to schools with 
extremely limited sources of revenue, it is unclear the extent to which poorer students benefited 
differentially. In some primary schools, BOS funds led to a near tripling of school revenue allowing 
schools to purchase writing utensils, supplementary teaching tools, textbooks, as well as to pay the 
salaries of temporary teachers.  
 
Looking to the future, the GOI aims to continue providing supply-side support to schools including 
teacher training and performance pay programs while also linking cash transfers more directly to 
improved schooling outcomes. Since late 2007, a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program has 
provided household incentives to maintain enrollment levels as policymakers consider expanding 
existing an scholarship program targeting poor households.  
 
2.2.3 The Road to Universal Health Insurance  
 
In August 2003, the GOI launched the JPK-Gakin28 program in the health sector. Financing for the 
program came primarily from two sources: PKPS-BBM compensation and special regional 
budgetary allocations (DAU). General program guidelines stipulated that poor households receive 
guarantees for free health services at public health clinics and hospitals. While evidence suggests that 
hospital utilization among beneficiaries has been low, this was the first time that a social assistance 
program in the health sector guaranteed hospital services for the poor. In early 2005, the GOI 
allocated approximately 3.9 trillion Rupiah of PKPS-BBM funds to expand and strengthen the JPK-
Gakin program which then became known as the Health Insurance for the Poor program or 
Askeskin, its Indonesian acronym. The program initially aimed to provide 60 million Indonesian 
households with health service guarantees worth 5,000 Rupiah per person per month.  
 
Three unique aspects of the Askeskin program set it apart from the previous JPS health programs. 
Firstly, unlike the JPS programs which provided unconditional grants to healthcare providers, 
Askeskin explicitly ties the grants to the amount of services provided to insured patients. Secondly, 
district governments are given the flexibility to design targeting and benefits schemes. In Tabanan 
                                                 
27 The categories included: registration fees, tuition fees, textbook procurement, improvements in teacher quality, 
extracurricular fees, transportation costs for poor students, school supplies, physical rehabilitation, utilities costs, testing 
fees, maintenance costs, teacher salaries, and housing costs for students in religious schools. 
28 Jaminan pelayanan kesehatan untuk keluarga miskin, health service guarantees for poor families.   
district, Bali, for example, officials undertook their own data collection on poor households, drawing 
up a different list of recipients than BPS, which they viewed as too subjective. In Purbalinnga 
district, East Java, officials designed separate insurance schemes for poor, previously poor and non-
poor with the co-payment increasing in welfare status. Thirdly, the program planners in Jakarta 
established Management Units (Bapel) tasked with overseeing local design and implementation in 
each district, and in late 2004, the GOI also authorized PT Askes, a for-profit public health 
insurance corporation with little experience implementing social assistance programs, to provide 
benefits alongside the Bapel. This created a competitive process among service providers with two 
rather different modes of operation. At the end of 2005, regional governments were asked to 
evaluate the two institutions and determine whether to continue using only one of the providers or 
both simultaneously. Subsequently, PT Askes managed the program through 2007 at which time the 
program was expanded to an additional 16 million households and renamed Health Insurance for 
the Population or Jamkesmas, its Indonesian acronym. The new program is managed and operated 
by the Ministry of Health, which has enforced stricter eligibility criteria and claims verification 
(Sparrow, forthcoming).  
 
A recent impact evaluation of Askeskin during its first year of operation finds that the program 
improved access to health care and also increased outpatient care utilization among the poorest 
quartile of households (Sparrow et al, 2010). The authors find that most of the increased usage 
occurred at public health facilities in rural areas and public hospitals in urban areas. By 2009, 
Jamkesmas had reached nearly 30% of Indonesian households with the benefit incidence outcomes 
being slightly less pro-poor than those of the UCT programs discussed earlier (Alatas, Purnamasari, 
and Wai-Poi, forthcoming). Coupled with evidence of the positive impact of the UCT on healthcare 
utilization (Bazzi, Sumarto, and Suryahadi, 2010), these findings point to a relatively successful 
government effort at boosting household healthcare usage across the country over the last several 
years. Moving forward, the GOI aims to continue improving the Jamkesmas program through more 
focused targeting and complementary supply side improvements. 
 
3 Moving towards a Permanent Social Protection Infrastructure 
 
Under the leadership of TNP2K, the GOI hopes to continue moving towards a more sustainable, 
integrated, and coherent social protection system. The framework upon which policymakers have 
settled is comprised of three clusters meant to improve the social and economic well-being of poor 
and near-poor households. The first cluster constitutes the major social assistance programs 
discussed in this paper including Raskin, the UCT and CCT, Askeskin and small but growing 
scholarship programs. This cluster forms the core of Indonesia's social protection system. Cluster 
two consists primarily of the National Program for Community Empowerment (PNPM), which was 
formally established in 2008 building upon the successes of the World Bank's Kecamatan 
Development Program. The program covers approximately 200 million Indonesians in over 70,000 
villages across the country and is aimed at stimulating pro-poor local economic growth while also 
strengthening governance and institutions. The third cluster aims to expand the availability of credit 
to micro- and small-scale enterprises. In some respects, the second and third clusters fall outside the 
purview of social protection in that these programs are designed as long-term poverty alleviation and 
development strategies rather than compensatory social assistance packages. 
 
In this section we review three key issues that must be addressed if Cluster 1 programs are to be 
successfully implemented as the first step towards a sustainable social protection system. First, the 
targeting of poor households must be improved. Second, the distinct role of conditional versus 
unconditional transfers must be determined with respect to program goals. Third, the GOI must 
carefully weigh the costs of subsidizing rice consumption while maintaining protectionist barriers to 
imports that have the potential to induce substantial volatility in domestic prices. 
 
3.1 Improved Targeting 
 
A notable feature of the social protection programs reviewed thus far has been the relatively weak 
targeting outcomes. Though most programs are pro-poor, all suffer from considerable inclusion and 
exclusion errors. Alatas, Purnamasari, and Wai-Poi (forthcoming) document that nearly half of all 
poor households benefited from only one of the three most important recent social protection 
programs---UCT II, Raskin, and Jamkesmas---while one quarter of all non-poor households 
benefited from two or three of these programs. 
 
The difficulty of targeting the poor and near-poor in Indonesia can be attributed to several factors. 
Firstly, inequality in Indonesia has been historically low relative to other developing countries in Asia 
and Latin America with large targeted social programs.29 In countries with relatively lower inequality, 
the distinctions between poor and non-poor tend to be less sharp particularly given the clustering of 
households around the poverty line (Chaudhuri, Jalan, and Suryahadi, 2002). Secondly, like many 
developing countries, the majority of the labor force works in the informal sector and hence 
enumerators are forced to rely on non-income based measures of economic status to identify 
variation across households. Household expenditure can be used as a reasonable proxy for income, 
but with high income volatility during crises, expenditures can vary wildly over a short period of 
time making it difficult to assign accurate welfare scores at the household level. Predicting 
consumption-based poverty using non-consumption indicators also poses numerous challenges with 
respect to identifying the poorest households.30 Lastly, although the absolute majority of poor 
households reside in rural areas, poor areas do not perfectly identify poor people.31 In this setting, 
geographic targeting through allocation quotas at the district or sub-district level can be ineffective 
without timely and accurate household data.  
 
Despite Indonesia‟s data-rich environment, at the time of the Asian financial crisis there was no up-
to-date, sufficiently rich administrative data with which to gauge the impact of the crisis. Effective 
targeting required much more precise information than was available from previous household 
survey data, insufficient and outdated BKKBN household-level data, and infrequently collected 
student records.32  
 
                                                 
29 The country‟s Gini coefficient has fluctuated between .3 and .35 since the early 1970s (Suryadarma et al, 2005).    
30 See Suryadarma, Suryahadi and Sumarto (2006) and Alatas et al (2010). 
31 Sumarto, Wetterberg and Pritchett (1998) show that there was a rather low correlation between a district‟s initial level 
of poverty and the welfare impact of the crisis.  
32 Policymakers and researchers fielded four major criticisms of using the BKKBN list for targeting: (i) it does not 
capture transitory shocks to income as it is based on relatively fixed assets; (ii) it includes non-economic criteria 
irrelevant to the health and nutrition-based welfare outcomes to which SSN programs are targeted (e.g. whether the 
family is able to meet religious obligations); (iii) the list is compiled by poorly trained workers at the village level so 
consistency across regions is uncertain; and (iv) the list is susceptible to changes by local government officials. “…to say 
it [BKKBN data] was based on a “survey” overstates the formality and rigor of the process.  Also the list was not 
centralized or computerized, but the list of household names was maintained at the local level and the higher levels of 
government only had access to summary reports of the number of households in each group” (Pritchett, Suryahadi and 
Sumarto, 2002, p. 7). 
Since the crisis, the targeting resources available to social assistance program administrators has 
improved somewhat. By 2005, the SMERU Research Institute had built a poverty map covering 
nearly every village in Indonesia and providing policymakers with highly disaggregated estimates of 
variation in economic well-being within and across villages. Additionally, prior to the rollout of the 
UCT in late 2005, BPS conducted a short survey of nearly 20 million households as input to the 
proxy means test (see above). In 2008, the survey was administered again as eligibility lists were 
redrawn for the second UCT.  
 
At present, plans are still underway to update the eligibility lists and more importantly to establish a 
national targeting system for all social protection programs disbursed at the household level through 
the creation of the Targeting Working group led by TNP2K. The aim of this initiative is to improve 
the accuracy of social programs in reaching the poor through the creation of a unified database of 
poor households. The database will include names and addresses of the poorest 40% of the 
population from which implementing agencies can draw lists of beneficiaries eligible to receive 
different social programs. Thus the goals of TNP2K on this front are: a) to develop a system to 
identify the poorest households in Indonesia based on scientific methods and unified technical 
criteria; b) to minimize targeting errors in order to improve the effectiveness of Indonesia‟s social 
protection programs; and c) to facilitate the coordinated use of a high-quality database of poor 
households by social protection program stakeholders. TNP2K is currently working closely with the 
Central Bureau of Statistics and the World Bank to oversee the coordination of the large scale survey 
of poor households (PPLS) planned for July this year.  Efforts are being made to improve the 
methodology used to collect and analyze the data.  The details of the targeting methods are currently 
being finalized, and the final decisions will depend on which methods are expected to be the most 
feasible and to achieve the best results in terms of reduced leakage and under-coverage. The future 
national targeting system will involve: a) managing the data required for program targeting; b) 
ensuring that implementing ministries improve the targeting of national poverty reduction programs 
using data managed by the working group; c) monitoring and evaluating the targeting performance 
of national poverty reduction programs.  
 
3.2 Conditional vs. Unconditional Cash Transfers 
 
Unlike the unconditional cash transfer programs in 2005 and 2008, which were intended to assist a 
large number of poor and near-poor households during temporary periods of high inflation, the 
conditional cash transfer program begun in 2007 was designed to provide longer-term financial 
support to a narrowly targeted group of very poor households. By 2010, the CCT program was 
operating in 20 of Indonesia's 33 provinces serving almost 800,000 households deemed chronically 
poor. The program specifically targets households with pregnant or lactating women or children 
aged 0-15 years with the benefits schedule ranging from 600,000 to 2.2 million Rupiah annually 
depending on household structure. Receipt of benefits is conditional on (1) enrollment and 
attendance of children aged 6-15, and (2) visits to health clinics for a range of services meant to 
improve maternal and infant health. 
 
Yulaswati and Sumadi (forthcoming) and a recent report by the World Bank (2011) identify several 
findings of interest based on an early evaluation of the program. First in program areas and 
particularly among recipient households, the CCT led to increases in pre- and post-natal visits to 
health centers, infant weight monitoring, delivery-assisted births, and immunization rates. The 
impact on enrollment rates was less pronounced, though absenteeism and hours worked outside of 
school was found to be significantly lower among children in beneficiary households. The program's 
effectiveness was moreover found to be strongest in areas with a deeper supply and delivery of 
public services. On net, the authors find that the CCT led to small improvements in child and 
maternal health and education indicators while also pressuring local governments to improve 
schooling and health facilities. As the program and its beneficiary children continue to age over 
subsequent years, it is expected that the magnitude of these impacts will grow accordingly. 
 
An important question is whether the benefits of tying cash transfers to behavioral outcomes 
outweigh the high costs of administering conditionality. Bazzi, Sumarto, and Suryahadi (2010) find 
that the UCT enabled school-age students in poor households to spend less time working during the 
academic year. The effect on enrollment was much more muted given that so few students dropped 
out of school (see Tables 2 and 3). In the absence of a rigorous evaluation comparing the effect of 
the UCT and CCT in a single estimating framework, we are unable to determine whether the 
conditionality component imparts differential benefits to households. As additional survey data 
arrive over the next few years, this sort of evaluation may be feasible in the Indonesian setting. 
Recent evidence from a randomized evaluation in Malawi finds that both conditional and 
unconditional cash transfers led to declines in dropout rates, but the effect of the CCT was only 
43% as large as the UCT (Baird, McIntosh and Ozler, forthcoming). Furthermore, the authors argue 
that given low marginal costs of administering conditionality, a CCT program ends up being a more 
cost-effective means of increasing and sustaining enrollment. Other evidence from the Bolsa Escola 
CCT in Brazil highlights the important role of conditionality in enabling parents to monitor children 
with a high propensity for absenteeism (Coffman and Burzstyn, 2011).  
 
To date, the prevailing view among Indonesian policymakers has been that UCTs should serve as 
compensatory programs to prevent poor and near-poor households from slipping deeper into 
poverty while a CCT can be designed to lift chronically poor households out of poverty over a 
longer time horizon. At present, there is discussion of re-introducing a UCT program to operate 
alongside the CCT. The extent to which these two schemes complement or substitute one another 
remains an open empirical question to which policymakers and researchers should direct careful 
analysis in the coming years. 
 
3.3 Rice Policy and the Future of Raskin 
 
Since the end of the Asian financial crisis, the government has introduced increasingly protective 
policies with respect to rice imports generating demonstrable effects on domestic prices. Although 
Indonesia has typically relied on imports for less than 8 percent of overall rice consumption, these 
imports, sourced primarily from Thailand and Vietnam, have played a considerable role in stabilizing 
domestic prices. Thus, 15 months after an official ban on imports was instituted in January 2004, 
domestic rice prices began to spike at precisely the time when world prices began to fall. This can be 
seen clearly in Figures 7 and 8. Though the ban on imports would effectively shield Indonesian 
consumers from the massive price shocks of early 2008, it would do so at the cost of permanently 
higher prices. It remains to be seen whether domestic prices will stay above world prices as the latter 
potentially return to lower levels over the coming months. 
 
The ban on imports and subsequent increase in domestic rice prices has been identified by several 
authors (World Bank, 2006; McCulloch, 2008; Warr, forthcoming) as the central cause of the 
otherwise anomalous increase in poverty incidence of 1.8% occurring between 2005 and 2006 (see 
Figure 1). Despite the introduction of the UCT and an expansion of Raskin benefits around the 
same time, near poor household were unable to cope with rising prices of their single most 
important consumption good. Certainly, while several million poor rice farmers potentially stood to 
gain from higher prices that could be fetched for their agricultural output. The extent to which these 
gains accrued to poor households remains an open empirical question.33 What remains 
uncontroversial is the fact that net rice consumers experienced a significant real income shock as rice 
prices ratcheted beyond their highest prior peak in the chaotic volatility of the Asian financial crisis 
(see Figure 8). 
 
Throughout this period of steadily rising domestic rice prices, millions of households continued to 
receive subsidized rice through the Raskin program. Drawing on the budgetary savings from fuel 
subsidy reductions, the GOI was actually able to extend Raskin benefits to an additional 10% of 
households between 2005 and 2007.34 Whereas average market prices of rice were around 6,000-
7,000 Rupiah per kilogram, Raskin entitled recipient households to 10 kilograms of rice per month 
at subsidized prices ranging from 1600-2000 Rupiah per kilogram. Given the prevalent availability of 
subsidized rice and the low price elasticity of rice demand, consumption of rice remained relatively 
constant while aggregate supplies were more restricted than years prior to the ban. This came at a 
substantial cost to poor households for which average household consumption is around 40 
kilograms per month. Under the optimistic assumption that Raskin beneficiaries obtain the full 10 
kilograms per month at subsidized prices, the higher prices they were now forced to pay for the 
remaining 30 kilograms effectively undermined the coherence of the government's key social 
protection policy with respect to food security. In a setting with lower and more stable prices, 
Raskin indeed has the potential to serve as a primary source of food security for recipients.35 The key 
will be to identify the appropriate middle ground between the risk of exposure to volatility in world 
prices and the sustained upward pressure on domestic prices in the absence of much-needed 
imports.36  
 
4 Lessons Learned and Ongoing Debates 
 
The government of Indonesia has an obligation to intervene in protecting the most vulnerable 
members of Indonesian society against the pernicious effects of market failures driven by the 
inability of poor households to articulate demand for social services through formal market 
mechanisms. Indonesia‟s social protection policy in the last decade reflects clear progress towards 
addressing these failures while distributing the gains from growth more equitably. This began with 
the JPS programs, which set the stage for the institutionalization of a social protection framework at 
all levels of governance. In subsequent years, policymakers utilized the Raskin program and also 
introduced new cash transfer, education and health programs to manage a gradual transition away 
from regressive fuel subsidies. Throughout this process, we have witnessed a steady growth in 
progressive public spending. 
 
                                                 
33 McCulloch (2008) provides a convincing ex ante analysis of the expected effects on poverty using retrospective 
household survey data. A more thorough ex post analysis based on local farm-gate price data, agricultural income, and 
household welfare has yet to be conducted. 
34 This calculation is based on Susenas data from 2005 and 2007. 
35 At the same time, a social protection program focusing on nutrition rather than food subsidies may be more 
appropriate to address chronic stunting of children.  The World Bank Nutrition at a Glance report from 2009 indicates 
that 37 percent of Indonesian children under the age of five are stunted, 18 percent are underweight, and 14 percent are 
wasted. 
36 Dawe (2008) argues that this middle ground can be achieved with a small import tariff on the order 4-5%. 
Nonetheless, key challenges remain. Targeting is an ongoing difficulty; poor data quality and weak 
accountability leads to errors of inclusion and exclusion across a wide range of social services. Poor 
coordination across agencies remains an issue, and the lack of timely, local monitoring of economic 
conditions limits responsiveness to economic shocks. Policymakers must also wrestle with the 
realities of the modern Indonesian political environment, where media personalities and opposition 
politicians can easily misrepresent complex proposals in their criticism, pandering to populist 
tendencies and ignoring technical nuance. Rapid political decentralization, though essential to local 
flexibility, may also impair the incentives and information available to decision makers. 
Ultimately, though, the fate of the poor hinges on factors other than improved targeting, perfect 
coordination, and appropriately calibrated conditionality.  
 
A truly sustainable reduction in poverty requires deeper investment in rural areas where the majority 
of the poor live, a reduction in the instability of food commodity and particularly rice prices, serious 
labor market reforms and a secure financing scheme for a permanent social safety net for poor 
households.37 GOI spending on social assistance programs, which has hovered around 0.5% of 
GDP in recent years, has generally been lower than other developing countries at comparable 
income levels (World Bank, 2009). Further reforms to existing commodity subsidy programs and an 
improved taxation system could generate substantial revenue gains that could then be reallocated 
towards more progressive forms of social spending. An equitable and efficient social safety net is 
one of the vital mechanisms in halting the intergenerational transmission of poverty. Indonesia‟s 
policymakers undoubtedly have the tools and the experience to emerge as a leader among 






















                                                 
37 These key issues are addressed at length in the forthcoming edited volume Employment, Living Standards and Poverty in 
Contemporary Indonesia, a text prepared by several leading Indonesian and foreign researchers with intimate knowledge of 
the Indonesian economy. 
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Figure 1: The Evolution of Poverty in Indonesia, 1980-2010 
 
Source: BAPPENAS calculations using Susenas data. Notes: The new method of constructing the poverty line introduced 
in 1996 uses a price index based on a consumption basket that more accurately reflects the consumption behavior of 
relatively poorer households. The new and old methods are not comparable over time. 
 
 



















Source: Sumarto, Suryahadi, and Widyanti (2005). 
 
 


















Figure 3: Comparison of Fuel Prices Across Asian Countries 
 
Source: Widianto,( 2009) 
 
 
Figure 4: Benefit Incidence of Fuel Products 
 
Source: Susenas 2004. Notes: The figures are calculated using the probability weights provided by BPS. 
 
 
Figure 5: Targeting Performance of the Unconditional Cash transfer 
 
Source: Susenas panel 2005-2006. Notes: Households report whether they receive the 1st and 2nd disbursements. The 
expenditure quintiles are calculated based on total pro-rated monthly non-food expenditures and food expenditures in 
the last week. 
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Figure 7: Nominal Domestic vs. World Rice Prices, 1985-2010 
 
Source: Warr (forthcoming). 
 
 
Figure 8 :Real Domestic Rice Prices, 1985-2010 
 
Source: Warr (forthcoming). 
 
 
Figure 9: Social Assistance Spending in Developing Countries 
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Table 1: Details of SSN programs in Indonesia during the economic crisis 












Sales of subsidized rice to targeted 
households 
5,450 12.8 million KPS and 












A loose, uncoordinated collection of 
several “labor-intensive” programs in a 
variety of government departments 









selection by wage 
rate 
SBG (scholarships 
and block grants to 
schools) 
Providing scholarships directly to 
elementary, lower secondary, and 
upper secondary students and block 
grants to selected schools 
1,138 6% of primary, 17% 
of lower secondary, 
















Providing ubsidies for medical services, 
operational support for health centers, 
medicine and imported medical 
equipment, family planning services, 
supplemental food, midwife services. 












Block grants for villages for public 
works or revolving funds for credit. 
1,701 Almost all villages in 
the country 
Geographic: 









Table 2: Binary Treatment Effets of Unconditional Cash Transfer 
  2005 to 2006  2005 to 2007 
Dependent Variable  TOT (Std. Error)  TOT (Std. Error) 
  
Estimator: Double robust (conditional on covariates Xi) 








   Δln(health expenditure/capita)  -0.029 (0.046)  -0.041 (0.076) 




 -0.002 (0.028) 
   ΔInpatient Utilization/capita  -0.010 (0.036)  -0.001 (0.025) 
   Δln(education expenditure/student)  -0.013 (0.046)  -0.200 (0.129) 
   I(student j dropout)  0.002 (0.002)  -0.001 (0.004) 












 -0.167 (0.185) 




 -0.641 (0.645) 
       
Significance levels : ∗ : 10%  ∗∗ : 5%  ∗∗∗ : 1%  
Source: Susenas panel 2005-2007. Notes: Full details on the variable construction and estimation strategy can be found in 
Bazzi, Sumarto, and Suryahadi (2010). Available upon request. 
 
Table 3: Multivalued Treatment Effects of Unconditional Cash Transfer 
  D=1 Recipients  D=2 Recipients TOT(1)=TOT(2) 
 Dependent Variable  TOT (Std. Error) TOT (Std. Error) [p-value] 
  
 Estimator: Double robust (Xi) 

























 0.035 (0.022) [0.575] 
   ΔInpatient Utilization/capita  0.005 (0.044)  -0.028 (0.031) [0.301] 












   I(student j dropout)
‡
 
 0.001 (0.002)  0.002 (0.001) [0.731] 
   Δ(share students working)  -0.012 (0.011)  -0.004 (0.006) [0.482] 
   Δ(hours worked per student)  -0.209 (0.232)  -0.110 (0.110) [0.675] 





Significance levels : ∗ : 10%  ∗∗ : 5%  ∗∗∗ : 1%  
Source: Susenas panel 2005-2007. Notes: Full details on the variable construction and estimation strategy can be found in 




Table 4: Poverty Transitions by Poverty and UCT Recipient Status 
 Poverty Status 
 2006 (N=9050)  2007 (N=7016) 
 Poverty Status, 2005 Poor Non-Poor  Poor Non-Poor 
Poor  0.17,  0.05  0.15,  0.06   0.09,  0.02  0.10,  0.04 
Non-Poor 0.10,  0.05  0.59,  0.84   0.17,  0.07  0.64,  0.88 
 Source: Susenas panel 2005-2007. Notes: The ( blue,  red) entries in each cell are the share of recipients and non-
recipients, respectively, moving from the given row to the given column in 2006 or 2007. Further details can be found in 
Bazzi, Sumarto, and Suryahadi (2010). Available upon request. 
 
 
 
